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ARTICLES
Does the Individual Mandate Coerce?
RAPHAEL BOLESLAVSKY & SERGlO J. CAMPOSt
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes an
individual mandate that penalizes individuals who do not purchase
health insurance. Critics of the individual mandate, including a
majority of justices on the Supreme Court, contend that Congress
cannot use its Commerce Clause power to coerce individuals to buy a
product. Supporters concede that the mandate coerces but argue that
it is otherwise permissible under the Commerce Clause. This article
questions whether the individual mandate coerces. It uses a simple
economic model to show that, under certain conditions, the individ-
ual mandate induces insurers to sell health insurance at a price each
individual would voluntarily pay. Accordingly, the article concludes
that the premise underlying the debate over the constitutionality of
the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause should not be
taken for granted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have not followed the news.' You decide to go to
an electronics store to browse high-definition televisions ("HDTVs"),
t Boleslavsky: University of Miami, Department of Economics, Coral Gables, FL 33146,
r.boleslavsky@miami.edu. Campos: University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL
33146, scampos@law.miami.edu. Many thanks to Ian Ayres, Owen Fiss, Pat Gudridge, Chris
Robertson, Neil Siegel, Peter Siegelman, and Susan Stefan for their helpful comments. Katie
DeMarco, Barclay Gang, Megan Ralstin, and Jordan Shaw provided excellent research assistance.
All errors are ours alone.
1. This hypothetical was used previously in a blog post by one of the authors to discuss this
article. See Sergio J. Campos, No Coercion, Maybe?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 12, 2012, 11:13 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/10/no-coercion-maybe.html.
1
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
and you are willing to buy an HDTV if it is less than $1,000. To your
surprise, your dream HDTV is on sale for $800. In fact, all of the
HDTVs in the store are being sold at much lower prices. After you hap-
pily buy your dream HDTV, you walk out of the store and pass by a
newspaper stand. You read the following headline on the cover of a
newspaper: "GOVERNMENT MANDATE TO PURCHASE HDTVS
LOWERS PRICES." You purchase a copy of the newspaper and read
the article, which states that Congress passed a law requiring all persons
to buy an HDTV, and that the law caused HDTV manufacturers to
decrease the price of televisions.
Were you coerced into buying your HDTV by the mandate?
Because you willingly purchased the TV at the new (low) price, a claim
of coercion is difficult to support. For example, if the price drop had
been caused by competitive market pressure, or by improvements in pro-
duction technology, then it would be difficult to claim coercion. If the
price drop is generated by a mandate, then similar reasoning should
also apply: You voluntarily purchased the HDTV because the price was
right, and therefore, you were not coerced.
In this article we show that, like the above hypothetical market for
HDTVs, a mandate in the market for health insurance does not neces-
sarily lead to coercion. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA")2 contains provisions that penalize certain individuals who fail
to purchase health care insurance.3 These provisions are commonly
known as the individual mandate. Since the passage of the ACA, an
extensive debate has taken place over Congress's ability to enact the
individual mandate under the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress
the "Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States . . . ."4 Critics of the individual mandate contend that Congress
cannot use its power under the Commerce Clause to coerce individuals
to purchase a product.5 Supporters of the individual mandate concede
2. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care & Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. These provisions are entitled the "[r]equirement to maintain minimum essential coverage"
and are codified as part of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1311
(llth Cir. 2011) ("[W]hat Congress cannot do under the Commerce Clause is mandate that
individuals enter into contracts with private insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive
product from the time they are born until the time they die."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("At its core, this dispute is not simply about
regulating the business of insurance-or, crafting a scheme of universal health insurance
coverage-it's about an individual's right to choose to participate."), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th
Cir. 2011); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
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that the mandate coerces, but argue that it is a permissible exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause power because of the uniqueness of the
health care market.6
The debate has resulted in litigation in a number of state and federal
courts, which culminated in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, decided by the Supreme Court at the end of the 2012
term.' There, the Court upheld the mandate as a valid exercise of Con-
gress's tax power.' However, the Court was divided over whether Con-
gress could enact the mandate under the Commerce Clause. A majority
of justices agreed with critics that the Commerce Clause does not permit
Congress to "compel[ ] individuals to become active in commerce by
purchasing a product."' They pointed out that if the individual mandate
is upheld under the Commerce Clause, then "Congress could address the
diet problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables."' 0 The remaining
justices conceded that the individual mandate coerces." However, par-
roting the supporters, they concluded that the individual mandate is valid
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 634 (2010) (arguing that
commandeering citizens to purchase health insurance is unconstitutional, specifically noting that
the individual mandate "crosses an important line between limited and unlimited government
power"); Interview by Ezra Klein with Randy Barnett, Obamacare's Most Influential Legal Critic
on Tuesday's Oral Arguments, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/obamacares-most-inuential-legal-critic-on-tuesdays-
oral-arguments/2011/08/25/gIQAq2NpeSblog.html ("What the government is claiming here is
this power . . . to make people do business with private companies when Congress thinks it's
convenient.").
6. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, A Conservative Law Professor on the Obvious
Constitutionality of Obamacare, THE NEw REPUBLIC (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.newrepublic
.com/article/politics/102685conservative-defense-obamacare-affordable-care-health (arguing that
the mandate is constitutional because "the market for health care is distinctive (if not entirely
unique) in several key respects"); Brief of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars in Support of
Petitioners Urging Reversal on the Minimum Coverage Issue at 6, Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter "Economic Scholars' Brief']
(discussing the "substantial market imperfections in medical care"). For specific reasons why
supporters believe that the mandate is justified, see infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
7. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566.
8. Id. at 2600; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("Congress shall have the Power To lay
and collect Taxes . . . and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . ."). We do not address the issue, but others have. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S.
Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195
(2012).
9. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 123 S. Ct. at 2587. Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, echoed Chief Justice Roberts's rejection of the
government's Commerce Clause theory. See id. at 2575 (majority opinion); id. at 2643 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
10. Id. at 2588-89 (majority opinion) (citation omitted); see also id. at 2648 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("But the mere fact that we all consume food and are, thus, sooner or later, participants
in the 'market' for food, does not empower the Government to say when and what we will buy.").
11. Id. at 2619-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (accepting the idea that Congress is compelling
purchase of insurance).
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under the Commerce Clause given the special features of the health
insurance market.' 2
In this article we question the consensus that the individual man-
date coerces. Using a simple economic model provided in the Appen-
dix, 13 we show that, under certain conditions, the individual mandate
may not coerce individuals to purchase health insurance. Under the con-
ditions we identify, the model shows that the individual mandate induces
insurers to sell health insurance at a price that everyone would voluntar-
ily pay. Like the hypothetical HDTV mandate described above, the indi-
vidual mandate in the health insurance market may not coerce
individuals to purchase insurance against their will. Accordingly, we
show that the premise underlying the debate over the constitutionality of
the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause should not be taken
for granted.
We begin with an informal example to illustrate the consequences
of the individual mandate." The example first shows that the individual
mandate may generate a reduction in the price of health insurance. It
then shows that this price reduction may be large enough that everyone
would be willing to purchase insurance at the post-mandate price. After
discussing the example, we address counterarguments to our conclusion
that the individual mandate may not coerce." After a brief conclusion,16
we provide an Appendix, which contains a simple formal model that
justifies the conclusions contained in the informal example."
II. INFORMAL EXAMPLE
We begin with an informal example to illustrate our argument.
Imagine that the citizens of the United States who are subject to the
individual mandate can be divided into two groups of equal size, for a
total of 200 individuals. Individuals within either group may require a
health care treatment that costs $100,000 in a given year, but the groups
have a different risk of incurring this cost.'" The first group, the "high-
risk" group, consists of individuals who are relatively more likely to
need this treatment. Assume that each individual in the high-risk group
12. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. See infra Appendix.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Appendix.
18. We note that only 1% of all individuals have health care costs averaging $85,000, while
the yearly average for most individuals was $6,305 in 2007. See Economic Scholars' Brief, supra
note 6, at 8-9 (citations omitted). In this informal example, we set the numbers for ease of
exposition.
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has a 3% chance of incurring the cost of $100,000 in a given year. The
second group consists of "low-risk" individuals. In this group, the risk of
incurring this cost is lower, and thus each individual only has a 2.5%
chance of requiring the $100,000 treatment. Assume that the individuals
in both groups are willing to pay a premium for health insurance that is
equal to the expected cost of their health care." Thus, the high-risk
group is willing to pay a premium of $3,000 a year for health insurance,
while the low risk group is willing to pay a premium of $2,500 a year.20
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the United States has only
one insurer who has a monopoly in the market for health insurance,
but is subject to the threat of competition. 21 The threat of competition
restricts the profit of the monopolist. If the monopolist earns a suffi-
ciently high profit, a competitor may find it beneficial to enter the mar-
ket. In this example, suppose that the most the monopolist can earn
without triggering entry is $50,000.
Furthermore, assume that the insurer, as a monopolist, can purchase
health care for much less than any individual. For example, assume that
the insurer only has to pay $75,000 for the treatment above, rather than
the $100,000 each individual would have to pay if needed. However,
assume that the insurer does not have any information about each indi-
vidual's risk of needing health care, and thus, instead of pricing the
insurance on an individual basis, chooses a single price for everyone.2 2
Suppose that the insurer charges $2,750 for insurance. No one in
the low-risk group would purchase the insurance at this price because
each individual in the group would only be willing to pay $2,500. How-
19. Risk-averse individuals may actually be willing to pay more for the expected costs of
their health insurance. See Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J.
EcoN. LITERATURE 571, 577 (2008) (discussing risk aversion). We assume that the individuals
here are risk neutral for ease of exposition. As noted in the Appendix, the risk preferences of the
groups are irrelevant to our conclusions so long as the individuals within each group have the
same preferences. See infra Appendix.
20. In 2008, the average non-group policy annual premium for all individuals was $2,985,
and the average non-group policy annual premium for individuals aged 30-34, which would
approximate the low-risk group in our example, was $2,104. AMERICA'S HEALTH INS. PLANS CTR.
FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 2009: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF
PREMIUMS, AVAILABILITY, AND BENEFITS 5 (2009), available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/
20091ndividualMarketSurveyFinalReport.pdf; see also Economic Scholars' Brief, supra note 6, at
14 n.39 (citing this study to discuss impact of the individual mandate to low-risk individuals).
Again, we set the numbers here for ease of exposition.
21. This constraint is specified in more detail below. See infra Appendix.
22. We note that the individuals' differing preferences, along with the insurer's inability to
price discriminate among the individuals, may result in adverse selection. See George A. Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488,
493 (1970); see also Gruber, supra note 19, at 576. We further note that, as an empirical matter,
"there is surprisingly little work on the general question whether those who choose to be insured
are adversely selected ..... Id. at 577.
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ever, all 100 of the individuals in the high-risk group would purchase the
insurance because they are willing to pay as much as $3,000. The
insurer's revenue is $275,000 ($2,750 x 100) for the population, but the
insurer would have to subtract costs of $225,000 (0.03 x $75,000 x 100,
or 3 x $75,000).23 By charging a price of $2,750, the insurer generates a
profit of $50,000 ($275,000 - $225,000). This is the highest profit that
the monopolist can earn without triggering competition.
Now assume that the insurer sells the insurance for $2,312.50.
Here, individuals in both the low-risk group and the high-risk group
would be willing to purchase the insurance. The insurer would make
$462,500 ($2,312.50 x 200) for the population, and have costs of
$225,000 (0.03 x $75,000 x 100, or 3 x $75,000) for the high-risk
group, and $187,500 (0.025 x $75,000 x 100, or 2.5 x $75,000) for the
low-risk group. The total profit for the insurer, then, would be $50,000
($462,500 - ($225,000 + $187,500)). By charging $2,312.50, the insurer
also makes the highest profit possible without triggering competition.
Accordingly, either of these prices ($2,750 or $2,312.50) allows the
insurer to earn the highest profit possible. From the perspective of the
insurer, both of these prices are equivalent.
This equivalence does not hold in all scenarios. If the difference in
risk between the high-risk group and the low-risk group is significant,
then there may be no price that would induce everyone to buy insurance
while still earning the insurer a sufficiently large profit. For example, if
the low-risk group had a 1% risk of needing the health treatment, then
the insurer could not make a profit because the highest possible price it
could charge, $1,000, would not be able to cover all health costs. It
would only gain $200,000 (200 x $1,000) in revenues, but have
$300,000 ((3 x $75,000) + (1 x $75,000)) in costs.
However, if the risk of insuring both groups is sufficiently similar
(that is, the risk homogeneity of the groups is high), then the mandate
has the benefit of inducing the insurer to price health insurance low
enough so that everyone would be willing to buy it. And indeed, as
shown in more detail in the Appendix, a range of risk homogeneity
exists in which the insurer is indifferent between pricing insurance for
the high-risk group only, or pricing the insurance low enough so that
everyone would be willing to purchase. Either way, the insurer makes
the maximum profit possible.24
If the insurer is initially setting a high price and selling only to the
high-risk group, then the mandate can change the insurer's pricing
23. If the high-risk group of 100 has a 3% of incurring health care costs of $75,000, one can
infer that three individuals in the group will incur health care costs of $75,000.
24. See infra Appendix.
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behavior. By making a credible commitment to the insurer that everyone
will purchase, the individual mandate creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.
After the mandate is in place, the price drops enough that everyone will,
in fact, voluntarily purchase.
The credible commitment communicated by the individual man-
date, as it turns out, would not require the government to actually coerce
individuals to purchase health insurance against their will. Consider an
extreme example: Suppose that Congress communicates the passage of
the individual mandate to the insurer and to some (large) portion of con-
sumers, but some consumers remain unaware that the mandate is in
place. Once the insurer adjusts the price, even individuals who are
unaware of the mandate will voluntarily purchase the health insurance
because of the price." Thus, the individual mandate does not even have
to play a role in each individual's decision-making to cause each indi-
vidual to purchase health insurance.
Finally, this informal example and the model it relies upon show
that coercion is not necessary for the individual mandate to perform the
cross-subsidy and prepayment functions identified by the mandate's sup-
porters. Supporters of the individual mandate argue that the mandate is
necessary given (1) the inevitability of health care purchases over the
course of an individual's lifetime; (2) the uncertainty of when an indi-
vidual would need to make those purchases; and (3) the refusal by soci-
ety to deny care to individuals who cannot afford to pay for it.26
Consequently, supporters contend that the mandate forces younger and
healthier individuals to purchase health insurance, which, when com-
bined with the "community rating" 27 and "guaranteed issue"28 provi-
sions of the ACA, lowers the cost of health insurance for everyone.2 9
25. We assume for this model that people who are willing to buy health insurance at a given
price will do so at that price. For a discussion of this assumption, see infra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
26. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring); Economic Scholars' Brief, supra note 6, at 6-13; see also Kenneth J. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 948-54
(1963). The refusal to deny care is reflected in federal and state laws that mandate treatment in
certain cases without regard to the patient's ability to pay. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g)-(h) (2006)
(mandating treatment of emergency patients without regard to their ability to pay); FLA. STAT.
§ 395.1041(3)(k)(1) (2012) (mandating provision of emergency care if requested).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b) (Supp. V 2012) (prohibiting an insurer from "requir[ing] any
individual . . . to pay a premium or contribution which is greater than such premium or
contribution for a similarly situated individual" based on certain health-status factors).
28. Id. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a) (Supp. V 2012). Section 300gg-1 provides that
"each health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or group
market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the State that applies for such
coverage."
29. Specifically, (1) forcing younger and healthier individuals to purchase health insurance
(the individual mandate); (2) prohibiting price discrimination among customers (the community
2013] 7
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Supporters also point out that the mandate coerces individuals to prepay
for their own health care to eliminate free riding.3 0
But as the informal example shows, the mandate can perform these
functions without coercion. If the insurer sells only to the high-risk
group before the mandate, then all of the profits of the insurer are
extracted from this group, leaving each high-risk individual with a $250
gain ($3,000 - $2,750) from trade. After the introduction of the man-
date, the insurer extracts profit from both groups, relieving some of the
pressure on the high-risk group. Under the mandate, the price drops to
$2,312.50, increasing the gains from trade to the high-risk group to
$687.50 ($3,000 - $2,312.50), a more than $400 increase. At the same
time, the low-risk group is also voluntarily purchasing, so they must
expect positive gains from trade as well, $2,500 - $2,312.50, or
$187.50. The insurer is equally well-off in both cases, earning the maxi-
mum profit possible without triggering entry from competitors, $50,000.
Introducing the mandate thus improves the payoffs of both groups of
individuals without reducing the insurer's profit.
Moreover, the insurer's economies of scale generate an incentive
for both groups of individuals to prepay for their health care through
health insurance rather than purchase health care when the need arises.
As shown in the example above, both groups save money by purchasing
rating provisions); and (3) prohibiting health insurers from refusing to insure an individual (the
guaranteed issue provisions) all result in younger and healthier individuals subsidizing the health
expenditures of others. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 535 (upholding the mandate,
noting that "Congress found that '[b]y significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the
[minimum coverage] requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will lower health
insurance premiums."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (Supp. V 2012)); Economic Scholars'
Brief, supra note 6, at 10 ("Health insurance is a mechanism for spreading the costs of that
medical care across people . . . ."); Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 46 (2010)
("To ... lower insurance costs, health reform must bring younger and healthier persons into the
risk pool.").
30. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 535 (upholding the mandate, noting that
"Congress found that without the minimum coverage provision, other provisions in the Act, in
particular the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements, would increase the incentives
for individuals to 'wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care'" (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 18091(2)(I) (Supp. V 2012))); see also id. at 557 (Sutton, J., concurring) ("The basic policy
idea, for better or worse (and courts must assume better), is to compel individuals with the
requisite income to pay now rather than later for health care."); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1,
18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding mandate, noting that "Congress, which would, in our minds,
clearly have the power to impose insurance purchase conditions on persons who appeared at a
hospital for medical services-as rather useless as that would be-is merely imposing the
mandate in reasonable anticipation of virtually inevitable future transactions in interstate
commerce"), abrogated by Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012);
Economic Scholars' Brief, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that health insurance "mitigat[es] the risk of
facing overwhelming costs at a particular time by substituting a lower, regular premium cost over
a longer period").
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health insurance from the insurer rather than purchasing the treatment
out of pocket.
III. DiscusSION
The informal example, and the model in the Appendix that justifies
it, show that, under certain conditions, the individual mandate may not
coerce. In this brief discussion, we address possible counterarguments to
our conclusions.
Critics may argue that the model does not take into account the
realities of the health care market. We concede that the model does not
capture the market's full complexity." In fact, this was a deliberate
choice. We have abstracted away from the many complex facets of the
health care market to demonstrate that the individual mandate may not
force individuals to buy insurance. In doing so, our model casts some
doubt on the central premise of the debate over the mandate's constitu-
tionality under the Commerce Clause.
Conversely, it may be the critics who take too simplistic a view of
the health care market. By arguing that the individual mandate coerces
individuals into purchasing insurance under the pre-mandate prices,32
critics ignore the price impact of the mandate. As we have argued in this
article, understanding the price impact is central to the question of
whether the individual mandate coerces. If the price drop is sufficiently
large so that all individuals are willing to voluntarily purchase at the new
price, claims of coercion are unsubstantiated.
Moreover, the claim that the individual mandate coerces is, at the
very least, exaggerated given empirical evidence about the U.S. health
care market. First, the model assumes that insurers can use economies of
scale in purchasing health care, and thus can purchase health care more
cheaply than individuals. There is some evidence to support this
assumption. Anecdotally, insurers, hospitals, and other health care pro-
viders generally use group-purchasing organizations ("GPOs") to
purchase health care supplies and devices, presumably to take advantage
of economies of scale. 3 3 Moreover, arguments in favor of single-payer
health care presume cost efficiencies that are consistent with the econo-
31. See Arrow, supra note 26, at 948-54 (discussing the unique features of the health care
market).
32. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5, at 633-34.
33. See Group Purchasing Organizations: Use of Contracting Processes and Strategies to
Award Contracts for Medical-Surgery Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (2003)
(statement of Marjorie Kanof, Director of Healthcare for Clinical and Military Health Care Issues,
U.S. GAO).
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mies of scale we assume in the model.34
Second, the model shows that the risk homogeneity among individ-
uals must be sufficiently high to avoid coercion. This may, in fact, be the
case. Under the ACA, the two groups with the highest risk of health care
expenditures-the elderly and the poor"-are excluded from the man-
date and are provided health insurance publicly through Medicare and
Medicaid.3 6 The ACA, moreover, expands the individuals covered by
Medicaid, even though, under the Supreme Court's ruling, states may be
less likely to implement the expansion." In addition to the limited scope
of the individual mandate, the ACA provides subsidies to individuals
who may not purchase health insurance because, while it may be other-
wise rational to purchase insurance, they do not have the ability to pay
for it.38
Critics may further argue that, given the large population affected
by the mandate, there may be individuals who are still coerced by it.
Under the model, the types of individuals who would be coerced would
be individuals who (1) have a very low risk of requiring health care and
(2) can self-insure all health care purchases. There is some empirical
evidence to suggest that there are not very many individuals who pos-
sess these two characteristics. In fact, in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
pointed to a study that showed that the number of uninsured individuals
who "did not want or need coverage" was too small "to warrant its own
category."39 The Supreme Court has further stressed that "where a gen-
eral regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of
no consequence."40
34. These arguments rely mostly on the reduction in administrative costs in a single-payer
system and a single-payer's monopsony power to negotiate lower prices for health care. See
Sherry Glied, Single Payer as a Financing Mechanism, 34 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 593,
601-05 (2009) (reviewing literature).
35. See, e.g., JENNIFER JENSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22898, GOVERNMENT SPENDING
ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS: A DATA BRIEF tbl.2 (2008).
36. See I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (exempting individuals from the mandate "who
cannot afford coverage"); § 5000A(f)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (providing that individuals who are covered
under Medicare and Medicaid satisfy the individual mandate requirement).
37. Cf. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (reducing the
incentives for states to accept the expansion because the original incentives in the ACA amounted
to "a gun to the head").
38. I.R.C. § 36B(a) (providing "premium assistance" for individuals subject to the mandate
based on certain income criteria).
39. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2613 n.l (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S. POPULATION:
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEw SURVEY, 2009 at 71 tbl.25 & 72 n.2 (2010), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalseries/sr 10/srlO_- 248.pdf).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 197 n.27 (1968)); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (noting that the Court
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Finally, critics may disagree with the definition of coercion used in
this article. We view coercion as a requirement to purchase a product
when it would not be rational to do so based upon the product's cost and
benefit. In our view, an individual is coerced if he or she is required to
purchase a product for which the value she gets for the product is less
than the price that she must pay. Critics may have in mind a more
expansive definition of coercion in which individuals are coerced if they
are forced to purchase health insurance even if it would be rational to do
so under the model. For example, an individual may refuse to buy insur-
ance out of spite or ideological commitments.
First, we assume that critics of the mandate do not contend that the
Constitution protects the liberty to refuse to purchase insurance and rely
on others to pay for health care when the need arises. There is a general
consensus that everyone has a responsibility to pay for his or her own
health care costs.41
We further assume that critics do not argue that the law protects the
freedom of individuals to refuse to purchase insurance based on misin-
formation or other rationality defects. Such paternalism may be frowned
upon by some,4 2 but it is generally not viewed as coercive under the law.
For example, courts generally prevent consumers from waiving certain
remedies when they purchase a product.4 3 As a result, manufacturers
pass on their expected remedy costs to the consumers, in effect forcing
consumers to purchase "mandatory insurance . . . for a single price" that
is tied to the product." Such "mandatory insurance" tends to be coercive
even under our own definition of coercion because the resultant
purchases generally do not "mirror the results achieved in voluntary
has "never required Congress to legislate [under the Commerce Clause] with scientific
exactitude"); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("When it is necessary [under the
Commerce Clause] in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise
thing to be prevented it may do so.") (citing Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927));
cf. Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1294 (11th Cir.
2011) ("Congress may, in some instances, regulate individuals who are consuming health care but
not themselves causing the cost-shifting problem.").
41. Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage
Provision, Mill's "Harm Principle," and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 374,
381-82 (2012) (noting lack of support for this definition of coercion).
42. Id. at 383 ("[John Stuart] Mill rejected paternalistic justifications for the exercise of
coercive power, which seek to prevent individuals from harming themselves.").
43. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 646 (1985) ("[Plublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market.") (quoting Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
44. Epstein, supra note 43, at 688 ("The current doctrines of products liability law can be
understood as a form of mandatory insurance that is tied to the sale of an automobile [or other
product]," where "a single price has to be charged . . . .").
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[transactions]." 4 5 But such "mandatory insurance" is ubiquitous in many
settings, and courts do not consider it coercive.46
Second, we are skeptical that preferences based on spite or ideol-
ogy would cause individuals to forgo health insurance that would be
rational to purchase based on their health risks. In addition, the individ-
ual mandate would not apply to some of these individuals because the
ACA excludes those who refuse to purchase insurance for religious
reasons. 4 7
Third, and most importantly, we emphasize that the definition of
coercion we use in the model is generally accepted in the law. In many
contexts, the law has recognized that an individual is not coerced to
purchase a private good if that individual otherwise would be willing to
pay the price for it. In antitrust cases, for example, courts have con-
cluded that an antitrust violation does not force a purchaser to buy a
good at an inflated price if the purchaser would be willing to pay that
price in the absence of the violation.4 8 Similarly, a fraud does not coerce
an individual to purchase a good if that person would have willingly
purchased the good in the absence of the fraud.49
IV. CONCLUSION
Our goal in writing this article is not to prove conclusively that the
45. Id. at 668.
46. Critics may argue that a state may coerce the purchase of mandatory insurance by limiting
the waiver of remedies, but the federal government cannot do so under the Commerce Clause.
However, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, federal law prohibits a supplier from
disclaiming any implied warranties to consumers under certain conditions, which effectively
requires consumers to purchase mandatory insurance under those conditions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 2308(a) (2006) (prohibiting disclaiming of implied warranties if the supplier provides a written
warranty or the parties enter into a service contract within 90 days). Relatedly, federal law
imposes a limitation on the waiver of remedies in the maritime context, effectively forcing
passengers to purchase mandatory insurance from the owner of the vessel. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 30509(a)(1)(A) (2006) ("The owner ... of a vessel . . . may not include in a regulation or
contract a provision limiting . . . the liability of the owner, master, or agent for personal injury or
death caused by the negligence or fault of the owner or the owner's employees or agents . . . .").
47. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (Supp. V 2012) (exempting from the mandate those who refuse
to purchase insurance because of religious objections or who participate in a "health care sharing
ministry").
48. E.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir. 2008)
(noting that an alleged antitrust violation may not have injured all plaintiffs because some "poor
negotiators" may have been willing to pay the same price in the absence of the violation); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that an
alleged price-fixing conspiracy may not have injured all plaintiffs because some plaintiffs may
have been willing to purchase the good at the inflated price).
49. E.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
alleged fraud may not have induced individuals to purchase cigarettes if they would have
purchased the cigarettes anyway because they "preferred the taste"); see also Sergio J. Campos,
Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 751, 758-65 (2012) (discussing examples).
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individual mandate does not coerce. Whether the mandate does coerce is
an empirical question that, according to the model we provide, depends
on a number of factors. Instead, our goal is to suggest that any argument
about the coercive effect of the mandate is incomplete if it does not
account for any price reduction generated by the mandate. Doing so
implicitly assumes that implementing the mandate will not reduce the
price. Although the Supreme Court has already passed on the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate, hopefully we will not make similar
assumptions so easily in the future. Because we all know what happens
when we assume ...
V. APPENDIX
We provide a simple formal model to justify our argument. A large
population of individuals exists. Each individual is at risk for an adverse
event, which can be interpreted as an illness or injury requiring medical
care. Different types of individuals face different levels of risk: High-
risk individuals are more likely to experience this event than low-risk
individuals. Let aH represent the probability that a high-risk individual
experiences the adverse event, and aL represent the probability that a
low-risk individual experiences the event; by definition, aH > aL. In
addition, let g represent the share of low-risk individuals in the popula-
tion; the probability that an individual drawn from the population is low
risk is therefore equal to g. Individuals do not know whether they will
have an accident or illness at the time they decide to buy insurance, but
they do know their level of risk. 0 No outsider, particularly an insurance
company, can directly observe an individual's type.
If they choose to do so, individuals can purchase insurance. To
keep the analysis as straightforward as possible, we assume that only a
single insurance plan is offered."' In exchange for a premium p, the
insurer promises to cover all losses caused by the adverse event, which
we normalize to one. Normalizing the payoff of the status quo (no
adverse event, no insurance) to zero, an insured individual expects a
50. We assume that individuals cannot affect the level of risk they face by changing their
behavior. We therefore do not incorporate moral hazard, a potentially important issue in insurance
markets (but not in the argument against the mandate), into the analysis. We note that the evidence
of moral hazard may be overstated due to income effects. See Gruber, supra note 19, at 578, 581
(citations omitted). Moreover, there are legal mechanisms to reduce or eliminate moral hazard,
such as deductibles and co-payments. See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONomic ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 194-99 (1987); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcON.
REV. 531, 536 (1963).
51. For simplicity, we assume that an insurer is unable to offer different plans in order to
screen the customer's information. We note that the ACA contains community-rating provisions,
which prohibit insurers from engaging in price discrimination on the basis of a consumer's health
status. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b)(I) (Supp. V 2012).
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payoff of -p whether or not the event occurs, while an uninsured indi-
vidual receives a payoff of zero if no event takes place and negative one
if the individual is required to pay for medical care in case of illness or
accident.
Event No Event
Insurance 
-p 
-p
No Insurance -1 0
If an individual has probability a; of having an adverse event and does
not purchase insurance, he or she expects payoff -a. By buying insur-
ance, the individual guarantees a payoff of -p. Therefore, the individual
will choose to purchase insurance if the price of insurance is less than
the probability of accident or illness, a > p.52 This simple idea points out
a fundamental aspect of the insurance market: High-risk individuals
have the greatest incentive to purchase insurance. If low-risk individuals
are willing to purchase insurance at a certain price, high-risk individuals
are also willing.
The insurance industry is characterized by a single incumbent firm
and a potential entrant. In order to enter the market, the entrant must pay
a fixed fee P, which covers infrastructure, staff, licenses, and other costs
associated with market entry. If the entrant chooses to enter the market
at a point in time, the entrant may have an advantage: By undercutting
the incumbent's price to consumers slightly and offering slightly more
to doctors and medical providers, the entrant could successfully poach
both the incumbent's customers and medical providers at terms nearly
identical to those offered by the incumbent. The entrant could therefore
earn nearly the same expected profit as the incumbent, while effectively
forcing the incumbent out of the industry." Thus, the presence of the
entrant limits the incumbent's ability to earn profit. If the incumbent's
expected profit exceeds the entry fee P, the incumbent should anticipate
being undercut by the entrant, leaving the incumbent with zero profit.
Thus, the incumbent's expected profit cannot exceed P, the entry fee.
Because the incumbent insurance firm is a large buyer of medical
services, it is able to negotiate favorable rates for these services with
hospitals and doctors, allowing it to pay a lower price for medical care
than is available to individual consumers. While an individual with no
52. Our model does not make any assumptions about each individual's risk preferences. Thus,
the model can accommodate both risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals as long as their risk
preferences are homogenous.
53. The same would be true if we considered competition over a longer time horizon. We
focus on one-time competition for ease of exposition.
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insurance pays a price of 1 for treatment in case of illness or injury, the
insurance company pays only c < 1 for its customer's treatment.
In the equilibrium of this market, the entrant chooses the price of
insurance to maximize its expected profit, accounting for the limitations
placed upon it by the potential entrant; meanwhile, individual consumers
choose whether or not to purchase insurance at the prevailing price. Of
course, the incumbent's expectation about its profit depends on its
beliefs about the type of individuals buying insurance. In turn, individ-
ual purchase decisions depend on prices. In equilibrium, sophisticated
firms understand consumer incentives to purchase insurance and expect
those individuals to purchase insurance for whom doing so is optimal.
To briefly summarize, we consider a market equilibrium in which
three conditions are satisfied:
* Consumer Rationality: Consumers purchase insurance if the bene-
fit of doing so exceeds the price; that is, if the price of insurance is
less than the probability of the adverse event.
* Profit Maximization: The insurance provider chooses its price to
maximize expected profit, anticipating rational purchase decisions
by consumers. The maximum profit that the incumbent can expect
to earn is equal to P, the entry fee.
* Small Entry Barriers: The fixed fee for entry, P, is positive, but
not too large. Specifically, 0 < P < (1 - g)(1 - c)aH
A. Equilibrium
Because the insurance provider cannot observe an individual's risk
level, it cannot charge different prices for different levels of risk. In the
simple insurance market that we consider, the firm charges a single price
for coverage. Each type of individual is willing to purchase insurance if
the price p is less than his or her probability of experiencing the adverse
event ai. Therefore, if low-risk individuals are willing to purchase insur-
ance, then so are high-risk individuals. This implies that an insurance
market can operate in only two possible equilibrium configurations:
* Separated: High-risk individuals purchase insurance, but low-risk
individuals do not purchase insurance.
* Pooled: Both high- and low-risk individuals purchase insurance.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is helpful to introguce one simple
piece of notation for purposes of exposition: Let b = -. The small
entry barriers assumption then ensures that b < (1 - g)(1 - c).
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1. SEPARATED MARKET
In a separated market, only high-risk individuals purchase
insurance. In this case, the insurer's expected profit is equal to
I7 = (1 - g)(p - ca). Profit maximization then implies that the insurer
would like to set a price to achieve its maximum feasible profit P.
Assuming that only high-risk individuals buy insurance, the insurer can
achieve its maximum profit P by selecting the price that solves the fol-
lowing equation:
g)1(p - caH) +P - +CH1I g
Provided that only high-risk consumers are willing to purchase insur-
ance at price p*, the consumer rationality condition is satisfied, and an
equilibrium with a separated market exists. This is the case whenever the
following inequality is satisfied:
(aL _ H L b +c<1
1 - g aH -
The second part of this inequality, I b + c < 1, is satisfied whenever the
small entry barriers assumption holds. Thus, an equilibrium with a sepa-
rated insurance market holds whenever:
L b
all I-g
al,
This result is intuitive. The ratio measures the degree of risk homo-
geneity between the groups. When this ratio is small, the low-risk group
is significantly less likely to have an accident than the high-risk group
(and vice versa). We have found that, when the risk faced by the two
groups differs significantly, an equilibrium exists in which only the
high-risk group buys insurance. The insurer achieves its maximum feasi-
ble profit by selling only to the high-risk group at relatively high prices.
Low-risk individuals have a significantly lower probability of having an
accident and are not willing to pay such a high price, leading to a sepa-
rated market.
2. POOLED MARKET
In a pooled market, both types of individuals purchase insurance. In
this case, the insurer's expected profit is equal to 17 = p - c(gaL +
(1 - g)aH). The insurer can achieve its maximum feasible profit P by
selecting the price that solves the following equation:
p - c(gaL +(-)aH) = p* = c(gaL +(I-)aH)+
Provided that both types of consumers are willing to purchase insurance
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at price p*, the consumer rationality condition is satisfied, and a pooled
equilibrium exists. If it is rational for low-risk individuals to purchase,
then it is also rational for high-risk individuals to purchase. Therefore, a
pooled equilibrium exists if the following inequality is satisfied:
C(gaL+( )aH)+fl<aL - c(1 - g) + b aL1 - cg aH
If this condition holds, then the market can be pooled in equilibrium.
Intuitively, because the two groups face similar (though not identical)
levels of risk, both types of individuals are willing to pay similar prices
for insurance. Here, the insurer achieves its maximum feasible profit /3
by setting a relatively low price that both groups are willing to pay.
We summarize these results in the following figure. Note that, as
represented in the figure below, c(1 - g) + b b
1- cg 1 -g
Separated Market
Pooled Market
0 c(1 -g) + b b 1
1-cg 1-g
In this figure, the axis represents the degree of risk homogeneity in
the population as represented by the ratio . The minimum value of
this ratio is zero, and the maximum possible Cvalue is one. High values of
this ratio correspond to a high degree of homogeneity between the two
groups, as each of their chances of having an adverse event is similar.
Low values of the ratio indicate that the probability of injury or illness in
the two groups differs significantly. In this case, homogeneity is low.
Consistent with the results presented above, when this ratio is less than
+ c, an equilibrium exists in which the market is separated. When-
ever this ratio is greater than cI - cg , an equilibrium exists in which
the market is pooled. Thus we find three cases of interest:
1. High homogeneity: If aH is high, the equilibrium market is
pooled.
aL
2. Low homogeneity: If -H is low in equilibrium, the market is
separated.
3. Medium homogeneity: If aH is intermediate, the equilibrium
market can be either separated or pooled.
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B. The Individual Mandate
In this section, we consider the effects of the individual mandate in
each of the three cases described above. In the high homogeneity case,
the market is already pooled. Because both types buy insurance even
without the mandate, introducing the mandate does not change the mar-
ket outcome. If homogeneity is low, the only possible equilibrium out-
come is a separated market. Here, imposing a mandate drives down the
price of insurance, but does not drive it down enough that low-risk indi-
viduals are willing to purchase at the new, lower price. Introducing a
mandate in this case coerces low-risk individuals to purchase insurance
against their will, benefitting high-risk individuals at the expense of low-
risk individuals. Therefore, the argument against the mandate applies in
a straightforward way.
Consider now the last case, in which homogeneity is in the middle
range. Here, both types of equilibria are possible. Which market config-
uration arises is therefore determined by the behavior of the insurance
provider: If the provider sets a relatively high price, the market will be
segmented, but a relatively low price leads to a pooled market. Because
the insurer expects the same profit in both cases, it has no clear prefer-
ence for either market configuration; thus, either market structure could
naturally arise.
However, if the market that arises is separated, then imposing a
mandate will change the prevailing market structure. If both types of
consumers are required to purchase insurance, the insurer will be willing
to sell to both types of consumers at a lower price, and this price drop
will be drastic enough that low-risk individuals will choose to purchase
at the new price. Here, the mandate does not force anyone to purchase
insurance against his or her will. In this case, imposing the mandate
causes the industry to switch from a separated equilibrium to a pooled
equilibrium; the insurer maintains the highest feasible level of profit,
and both types of consumers purchase insurance because it is optimal to
do so at the prevailing price. The mandate nudges the market out of a
configuration in which healthy individuals are excluded into a new con-
figuration in which both types of individuals voluntarily participate.
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